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AFFIDAVITS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE
AFFIDAVITS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE
DISQUALIFYING FEDERAL JUDGES
BY ROBERT E. ROSENWALD
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 21 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 25, prescribes
the conditions under which a party litigant may file an affidavit
of bias and prejudice disqualifying the judge from proceeding
with the cause. While the language of the statute is clear, the
law has been invoked so frequently that an imposing array of
cases has appeared. Careful analyses, of every phrase and word
mark the decisions, but owing to the fact that the statute only
twice has been scrutinized by the Supreme Court,1 the ultimate
judicial precedent is lacking, and there is a mild divergence be-
tween the courts in the several circuits.2 The trend of the opin-
ions, however, is clear. The statute is subject to the rule of strict
construction, and litigants may lose those privileges conferred
unless they carefully adhere to the law.3
II. PROCEDURE
The recused judge may pass upon the legal sufficiency of an
affidavit of bias and prejudice.4 In the event that the affidavit
is legally sufficient, the almost uniform practice has been for the
judge to certify his withdrawal to the senior circuit judge of his
circuit, and for the case to be reassigned.5 In the case of Lewis v.
United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit
said:
I Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co. (1913) 230 U. S. 35; Berger v.
United States (1921) 255 U. S. 22.
2cf. Nations v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 14 Fed. (2d) 507, and
Johnson v. United States (Dist. Ct., Wash. 1929) 35 Fed. (2d) 355, with
respect to names of informants, circumstances, and time and place of state-
ments constituting prejudice.
S Keown v. Hughes (C. C. A. 1, 1920) 265 Fed. 572, 1. c. 576; Benedict v.
Seiberling (Dist. Ct., Ohio, 1926) 17 Fed. (2d) 831, 1. c. 836; and Cuddy v.
Otis (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 33 Fed. (2d) 577, 1. c. 578.
4 Berger v. United States supra note 1, 1. c. 36; Cuddy v. Otis, supra
note 3, 1. c. 578; Johnson v. United States (Dist. Ct. Wash. 1929), 35 Fed.
(2d) 355, 1. c. 356-357; Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836; Na-
tions v. United States, supra note 2, 1. c. 509, and Morse v. Lewis (C. C. A.
4, 1932) 54 Fed. (2d) 1027, 1. c. 1029.
5 American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co. (Dist. Ct.
N. Y. 1933, Opinion by Manton, Circuit Judge) 6 Fed. Supp. 215, 1. c. 218,
et cas. cit. With respect to the right of the senior judge to determine which
district judge shall hear the case on reassignment, see In re De Ran (C.
C. A. 6, 1919) 260 Fed. 732, 1. c. 741.
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"It is thus the settled law * * * that, upon the filing of a
proper affidavit, if the affidavit for disqualification is in
proper form, the truth of the allegations therein are indis-
putable, and the duty of the judge, after the filing of the
affidavit is to proceed no further."6
It has been held, however, that a judge need not pass upon the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, but may refer the matter for
determination to the senior circuit judge,7 or to another district
judge."
If the judge concludes that the affidavit does not comply with
the statute, and orders it stricken from the files, an exception
may be taken to his action, and the point is thereby preserved
for appellate review.9 The proper procedure is to permit the
filing of the affidavit, and then if insufficient, to strike it, but as
long as the trial judge proceeds with the hearing, and an excep-
tion is saved, it is immaterial that the affidavit is not stricken.10
The action of the judge in refusing to disqualify himself is not
appealable, and may be reviewed only when the case is before the
appellate court after a final judgment has been rendered.1 1 The
timely filing of a legally sufficient affidavit does not divest the
Court of jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action
or of the parties, but voids the power of the judge against whom
it is directed to proceed further with the case. 1 The writs of
mandamus and prohibition are unavailing to prevent the recused
judge from hearing the case because the alleged error may be
reached when the case is finally appealed. 2
6 (1926) 14 Fed. (2d) 369, 1. c. 371.
7 Parker v. New England Oil Corp. (Dist. Ct. Mass. 1926) 13 Fed. (2d)
497.
8 Craven v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1927) 22 Fed. (2d) 605, 1. c. 607.
9 Ex parte Americar Steel Barrel Co. supra note 1, and Minnesota
& Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux (C. C. A. 8, 1934), 70 Fed. (2d) 545,
1. c. 547, Morris v. United States, (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 26 Fed. (2d) 444, 1. c.
449; Nations v. United States, supra note 2, 1. c. 508; and Benedict v.
Seiberliing, supra note 3, 1. c. 836. See, also, Duncan v. United States (C. C.
A. 9, 1931) 48 Fed. (2d) 128, 1. c. 134.
10 Shea v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1918) 251 Fed. 433, 1. c. 435, Bene-
dict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836, and cases cited under note 9, supra.
3- Baltuff v. United States (C. C. A. 1929) 35 Fed. (2d) 507.
'1l Carroll v. Zerbst (C. C. A. 10, 1935) 76 Fed. (2d) (Adv. Ops.) 961,
1. e. 962.
12 Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra note 1, Minnesota & On-
tario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, supra note 9, 1. c. 546 and 547, and In re
Equitable Trust Co. of New York (C. C. A. 4, 1916) 232 Fed. 836, 1. c. 840.
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III. STATUTORY LIMITATION AND CONSTRUCTION
The statute does not pertain to an appellate tribunal,13 nor to
a territorial court. In the case of Tjosevig v. United States, the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held that the sta-
tute "is by its terms made applicable only to the District Courts
of the United States, and it does not extend to a territorial
court."14
The law is expressly limited to "any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal," but whether it relates to bankruptcy matters has
not been determined. Affidavits of bias and prejudice have been
filed in bankruptcy cases, 5 but the Supreme Court has carefully
refrained from deciding whether such affidavits are proper.16
The statute does not extend to referees in bankruptcy. 17 Nor
should it be invoked in a contempt and disbarment proceeding
arising out of a case before the same judge whom it is sought to
disqualify.'8
The affidavit must be that of "any opposite party to the suit."
The courts have frequently held to be insufficient an affidavit of
a person not a party to the cause,' 9 but have never determined
who is an "opposite" party. The terms "real party" and "sub-
stantial party" have been employed, but not inclusively defined.20
An indemnitor of a bond given by a bankrupt and the alleged
actual owner of claims allowed to a creditor is not a party in the
contemplation of the statute.21 Neither is an attorney in fact,"
nor the bankrupt corporation and its officers. 2 The statute also
provides that no party may file more than one affidavit.2
It is imperative that the affidavit be "accompanied by a certifi-
is Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co. (C. C. A. 1, 1914) 213 Fed. 449.
24 (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 255 Fed. 5, 1. c. 6; Ibid., Fleming v. United States
(C. C. A. 9, 1922) 279 Fed. 613.
15 Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra note 1; In re De Ran,
supra note 5; DeRan v. Killits (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 8 Fed. (2d) 840; Anchor
Grain Co. v. Smith (C. C. A. 1924) 297 Fed. 204.
16 Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra note 1.
"7 In re McFerren (Dist. Ct. Ill. 1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 180, 1. c. 181.
is In re Ulmer (Dist. Ct. Ohio, 1913) 208 Fed. 461, 1. c. 467-468; and
Bowles v. United States (C. C. A. 4, 1931) 50 Fed. (2d) 848, 1. c. 850-851.
29 Berger v. United States, supra note 1; Anchor Grain Co. v. Smith (C.
C. A. 5) 297 Fed. 204, 1. c. 205; Cuddy v. Otis, supra note 3; and Benedict
v. Seiberling, supra note 3.
2" Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836.
21 DeRan v. Killits, supra note 15.
"2 Cuddy v. Otis, supra note 3, 1. c. 578.
"3 Anchor Grain Co. v. Smith, supra note 15, 1. c. 205.
24 Berger v. United States, supra note 1, 1. c. 36; Saunders v. Piggly
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cate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are
made in good faith. ' 25 And "counsel of record" means a licensed
attorney, authorized to practice law in the district court, and
counsel for the affiant prior to the filing of the affidavit.28 It is
insufficient that the person executing the certificate is "attorney
of record" as long as he has not been counsel for the affiant.27
In the case of Morse v. Lewis, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Fourth Circuit, speaking of an affidavit of bias and prejudice
certified by an -attorney who had not been admitted to practice
in the district court in which the case was tried, said:
"The Texas attorney who signed the certificate in this
instance had not been admitted to practice in the trial court
and therefore was not qualified to practice as an attorney
in the case. * * * This requirement is not merely technical,
but is one of the safeguards provided by the act to insure as
far as possible that no affidavit of prejudice will be made
except in good faith. It is important that the court, which
has no means of protecting itself from unjustified attack,
shall at least have the protection afforded by the certificate
of a responsible member of the bar."28
It is said in Ex pxarte N. K. Fairbank Co.:
"The certificate of good faith is not made by any 'counsel
of record' of this court. The gentleman who makes the cer-
tificate has never been admitted as an attorney of this court.
He has never signed the roll of its attorneys or taken the
oath as required by its rules, and has never been recognized
by the court as a counselor thereof in any proceding had in
this or any other cause in this court.129
The purpose of the certificate of a counsel of record to an affi-
davit of bias and prejudice is to give credence to such affidavit,
to prevent parties litigant from practicing frauds upon courts,
and to subject the attorney as an officer of the court to disbar-
ment and contempt proceedings in the event that he makes a
false and fraudulent certificate.30
Wiggly Corp. (Dist. Ct. Tenn., 1924) 1 Fed. (2d) 582, 1. c. 585; and In re
McFerren, supra, 1. c. 181.25 Klose v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1931) 49 Fed. (2d) 177, 1. c. 179;
Keown v. Hughes, supra note 3, 1. c. 576.26 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 588; Morse v.
Lewis, supra, note 4, 1. c. 1032.
27 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 588.
28 Supra note 4, 1. c. 1032.
29 (Dist. Ct. Ala. 1912) 194 Fed. 978, 1. c. 985.30 Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, supra note 9, 1. c. 547;
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The certificate must be executed by individual attorneys, not
by a law partnership. Thus, it was stated in the case of Bene-
dict v. Seiberling:
"We are forced to hold that the word 'counsel' used in the
statute denotes a human being, having individual intelli-
gence, conscience, and power of discrimination necessary to
witness to a fact into whose constituency these attributes
must enter. An artificial entity, one a creature of law or
custom, as a partnership or corporation, has, as such, none
of these attributes. It is not capable, as such, of giving testi-
mony-i. e., of certifying to the existence of any fact-much
less to such as a state of good faith. '31
The mandate of the statute is that the affidavit "shall be filed
not less than ten days before the beginning of the term of the
court, or good cause shall be shown for the failure to file it
within such time." This provision is perhaps the most trouble-
some feature of the law. Since the enactment of the statute in
1911, many cases have been handed down construing the.clause,
and these cases are essentially sui generis. In the case of Morris
v. United States the defendent filed an affidavit of bias and prej-
udice on the day of trial, claiming that certain vital facts upon
which the affidavit, in part, was predicated had come to his
knowledge the day before the date when the affidavit was exe-
cuted. In concluding that the affidavit was timely, the court said:
"Assuming that until the 20th day of July, 1927, de-
fendant in the face of persuasion of his counsel was hesitant
or in doubt, we think we cannot say as a matter of law that
the additional alleged information was not calculated to con-
firm a doubtful belief upon the subject, and if it was suffi-
cient and did have that effect, defendant could not well have
acted more promptly in preparing his application and affi-
davits and filing the same than the following morning. In
these circumstances we are of opinion that the application
should not have been held untimely."32
Berger v. United States, supra note 1, 1. c. 33; Nations v. United States,
supra note 2, 1. c. 509; Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c.
587-588; Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836; Cuddy v. Otis, supra
note 3, 1. c. 578; American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co.,
supra note 5, 1. c. 219; and Johnson v. United States, supra note 2, 1. c.
357. See also, Bowles v. United States, supra note 18, 1. c. 851, and Hertz
v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 18 Fed. (2d) 52, 1. c. 54, 55.
3' Supra note 3, 1. c. 838
32 (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 26 Fed. (2d) 444, 1. c. 449. Ibid., Nations v. United
States, supra note 2, 1. c. 509.
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The contrary conclusion was reached by the same court in the
case of Bommrito v. United States in which the facts are clearly
distinguishable. It was said:
"It will be noted that the affidavit was sworn to on the
third day of April, 1931, but was not presented to the court
until the 7th day of April, 1931. If the appellant in good
faith believed and had reason to believe on April 3, 1931,
that the judge who was to try this case was prejudiced, it
was his duty to present his affidavit and application promptly
and he could not wait four days and until the case was called
for trial, and then insist upon the judge disqualifying him-
self and delaying the trial until some other judge was avail-
able. The court was entirely justified in overruling the ap-
plication for that reason alone."' 3
In the case of Bishop v. United States an affidavit was filed on
the day of trial, after many witnesses had been subpoenaed. The
reasons set forth in the affidavit as the basis of the complaint of
prejudice were known to the parties long prior to the date set for
trial, except one, which came to their knowledge four days before
the affidavit was filed. The court said it would have been impos-
sible to file the affidavit ten days prior to the beginning of the
term because the case was set at the same term at which the
indictment was returned, but held the affidavit untimely for the
reason that-
"It is the intent of the statute that the affidavit must be
filed in time to protect the government from useless costs,
and prevent useless delay of trials, and parties filing such
affidavits should be held to strict diligence in presenting the
claims of disqualification. There is no reason why this affi-
davit could not have been filed previous to the morning of
trial, and at a time when the facts upon which it was to be
based were fully known to defendants' counsel." 3' 4
An affidavit was held to be untimely when it was filed during
foreclosure proceedings while the motion of the plaintiff to fix
an up-set price was pending, and did not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction.'5 In the case of Ex parte Americal Steel
Barrel Co., the Supreme Court said:
"Neither was it (the statute) intended to paralyze the
action of a judge who has heard the case, ,or a question in it,
33 (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 61 Fed. (2d) 355, 1. c. 356.
4 (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 16 Fed. (2d) 410, 1. c. 411.
35 In re Equitable Trust Co. of New York, supra note 12, 1. c. 840.
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by the interposition of a motion to disqualify him between a
hearing and a determination of the matter heard. This is
the plain meaning of the requirement that the affidavit shall
be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the
term .,
38
The principles of law to which reference has been made are
abundantly supported by other cases.3 7
While an affidavit may be predicated upon information and be-
lief,38 it must state the facts and reasons for the belief that bias
or prejudice exists.39 The rule is stated by the Supreme Court
in the case of Berger v. United States.
"Of course, the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant
entertains are an essential part of the affidavit, and must
give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may
prevent or impede impartiality of judgment."40
It is essential that the bias or prejudice alleged shall be per-
sonal.4 1 Mr. Justice Lurton in the American Steel Barrel case
aptly summarized this statutory requirement.
"The basis of the disqualification is that 'personal bias or
prejudice' exists, by reason of which the judge is unable to
impartially exercise his functions in the particular case. It
is a provision obviously not applicable save in those rare in-
stances in which the affiant is able to state facts which tend
to show not merely adverse rulings already made, which may
36 Supra note 1.
37 Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, supra note 9, 1. c. 547;
Rossi v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 16 Fed. (2d) 712, 1. c. 716; Ex
parte Glasgow (Dist. Ct. Ga. 1912), 195 Fed. 780, 1. c. 782; American Brake
Shoe & F. Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., supra note 9, 1. c. 217-218; Chafin
v. United States (C. C. A. 4, 1925) 5 Fed. (2d) 592, 1. c. 593-595; Shea v.
United States, supra note 10, 1. c. 434-435; Lipscomb v. United States (C.
C. A. 8, 1929) 33 Fed. (2d) 33, 1. c. 34; De Ran v. Killits, supra note 15,
I. c. 841; Bowles v. United States, supra note 18, 1. c. 851; Klose v. United
States, supra note 25, 1. c. 179; Anderson Coal Co. v. Waban Rose Con-
servatories, (Dist. Ct. Mass. 1921) 278 Fed. 945, 1. c. 947; and Duncan v.
United States, supra note 9, 1. c. 134.
38 Berger v. United States, supra note 1, 1. c. 35; Nations v. United
States, supra note 9, 1. c. 509; and Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3,
1. c. 836.
39 Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, supra note 9, 1. c. 547;
Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 584; In re McFerren,
supra note 17, 1. c. 581 and 582; Keown v. Hughes, supra note 3, 1. c. 577;
and Klose v. United States, supra note 25, 1. c. 179.
40 Supra note 1.
41 In re Equitable Trust Co. of New York, supra note 12, 1. c. 840; and
Henry v. Speer (C. C. A. 5, 1913) 201 Fed. 869, 1. c. 871; and Johnson v.
United States, supra note 4, 1. c. 357.
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be right or wrong, but facts and reasons which tend to show
personal bias or prejudice. ' '42
It has been held consistently that the trial judge's unfavorable
judicial expressions of a litigant, comments in previous litigation,
judicial rulings in the pourse of trial, and prejudging the case do
not constitute bias or prejudice in the contemplation of the sta-
tute.43
In the case of Craven v. United States the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the First Circuit said:
"At most, then, the affidavit charges a 'bias and prejudice,'
grounded on the evidence produced in open court at the first
trial, and nothing else. We hold that such bias and prejudice
* * * is not personal; that it is judicial. 'Personal' is in con-
trast with judicial; it characterizes an attitude of extra-judicial origin, derived non coram judice. 'Personal' char-
acterizes clearly the prejudgment guarded against. It is the
significant word of the statute. It is the duty of a real judge
to acquire views from evidence.""4
Accordingly, in those cases in which the facts have been stated,
and in which they are legally sufficient, the courts have held the
presiding judge to be disqualified.45 Thus, in a criminal case
under the Espionage Act, the Supreme Court concluded that the
district judge erred in presiding at the trial of a defendant
who alleged in his affidavit that he was born in Germany and that
the judge because of his public utterances which were set forth
in the affidavit was prejudiced against the defendant on account
of his nativity.46
In a case in which the defendant was charged with the viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act, an affidavit was ruled to be
42 Supra note 1.
43 Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, supra note 9, 1. c. 547;Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836; Henry v. Speer, supra note
41, 1. c. 872; Parker v. New England Oil Corp., supra note 7, 1. c. 498;
Craven v. United States supra note 8, 1. c. 607; Saunders v. Piggly WigglyCorp., supra note 24, 1. c. 585-586; Morse v. Lewis, supra note 4, 1. c. 1031;
Cuddy v. Otis, supra note 3, 1. c. 578; American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v.Interborough Rapid Transit Co., supra note 5, 1. c. 218; United States v.
Fricke (Dist. Ct. N. Y. 1919) 261 Fed. 541, 1. c. 545; and SacramentoSuburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Tatham (C. C. A. 9, 1930) 40 Fed. (2d) 894.
44 Supra note 8, 1. c. 607-608.
45 Berger v. United States, supra note 1; Morris v. United States, supra
note 9, 1. c. 446-449; and Chafin v. United States, supra note 1, 1. c. 593-
594. c. f. Nations v. United States, supra note 2.48 Berger v. United States, supra note 1, 1. c. 28-38.
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sufficient in alleging that the trial judge had said that the accused
was one of the worst bootleggers in the country.47
There appear to be no reported cases in which an affidavit has
been filed for and in behalf of the United States. However, such
an affidavit recently was filed in the District Court of Kansas.
It appears that one Shepard, a major in the United States army,
was accused of poisoning his wife on a military reservation. He
was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by District
Judge Hopkins. Shepard's conviction was reviewed by the Su-
preme Court on a writ of certiorari; the judgment was reversed
and the cause remanded to the district court.48 Thereafter, and
before the re-trial, the defendant filed an affidavit alleging that
Judge Hopkins was prejudiced against him. The judge then certi-
fied his withdrawal to the senior circuit judge of the Tenth Cir-
cuit, and District Judge Pollock was assigned to hear the case.
Thereupon the United States District Attorney filed an affidavit
of bias and prejudice against Judge Pollock who in turn certified
his withdrawal, and the case finally was assigned to a third judge
for trial.
It is the law that an affidavit is frivolous which alleges that
the judge in charge of a criminal docket indecorously conducts
himself by conferring with a United States Attorney, and that
such a conference cannot be considered as grounding an infer-
ence of improper scheming against the right of a defendant to a
fair and impartial trial.49 Social and business intimacy of the
judge with parties to an action must be alleged with particularity
before disqualification results .5  Personal bias and prejudice do
not arise merely because it is alleged that the judge has expressed
himself in condemnatory terms of affiant, and by such expres-
sions has unjustly ascribed and imputed to affiant "unlawful and
base motives and purposes."'51 In considering allegations of this
47 Morris v. United States, supra note 9, 1. c. 449. With respect to the
necessity of alleging facts in war risk insurance cases, see Johnson v.
United States, supra note 2.
48 Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96.
49 Craven v. United States, supra note 8, 1. c. 607.
51 Morse v. Lewis, supra note 4, 1. c. 1031.
51 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 585. To the same
effect are Morse v. Lewis, supra note 4, 1. c. 1031, and Duncan v. United
States, supra note 9, 1. c. 134.
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character the court may take judicial notice of record entries and
written opinions in the cause.52
"Mere rumors, gossip, general statements that affiant by
some person is informed and believes that at some time, some
place, some occasion, the judge expressed sentiments mani-
festing bias or prejudice, are not enough, but informant, and
time, place, occasion of, and the judge's expressions * * *
must be set out in the affidavit. ' 3
Aptly, it has been said that it was not "the intention of Con-
gress to put it within the power of an oversensitive litigant, how-
ever honest he might be in his belief, to remove a judge merely
because there existed in the mind * * * some imaginative reason
or belief that the judge had formed a dislike for him, or within
the power of a litigant to avail himself of this section by adroitly
drawn and carefully considered insuative statements, which ap-
parently upon their face would show bias or prejudice."'a
The courts have practically applied the rule that an affidavit
is insufficient unless upon its face it convinces a reasonably pru-
dent judge that bias or prejudice does in fact exist.", Thus the
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Henry v. Speer concluded
that the statute is meant to afford relief from adventitious pre-
dicaments which fair-minded men recognize should be relieved
against, when they in fact exist.5  In the case of Ex parte N. K.
Fairbank Co., it is said:
"The impressions, whether favorable or unfavorable, of
men, which a judge receives, or his convictions about them
growing out of his contact or acquaintance with them in the
ordinary walks of life, cannot fall within the evil the statute
designs to suppress, unless they are so strong that they re-
sult in personal bias or prejudice as to individual suitors,
dominating the judge to such an extent that they beget a
mental or moral condition which makes the judge willing to
do wrong although he sees the right, **,,,7
52 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 586; and Bene-
dict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c. 836.
53 Johnson v. United States, supra note 2, 1. c. 357.
54 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 585.
55 Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24, 1. c. 585; Henry v.
Speer, supra note 41, 1. c. 871; Benedict v. Seiberling, supra note 3, 1. c.
836; Keown v. Hughes, supra note 3, 1. c. 577; and Ex parte N. K. Fair-
bank Co., supra note 29, 1. c. 989-990.
56 Supra note 41.
57 Supra note 29.
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While in some instances judges have voluntarily withdrawn
from cases after ruling affidavits of bias and prejudice to be
legally insufficient,58 they generally have been reluctant to retire
and have continued to preside at the trial because a judicial officer
against whom an insufficient showing for recusation has been
made owes it to his oath of office and to the litigant who invokes
the jurisdiction of the court over which he presides not to with-
draw from the case.5 9 Coupled with this are the further reasons
that to do so would greatly prejudice the dispatch of the business
of the court, result in delays in the disposition of cases, and
compel some other judge to do a vast amount of work which the
disqualifying judge already has done.60
IV. CONCLUSION
The prophecy of the Supreme Court that litigants and their
attorneys would abuse the privileges which the statute con-
ferred"' has been confirmed. In the vast majority of reported
cases the courts have held the affidavits to be inadequate and in-
sufficient to divest the trial judges of jurisdiction to proceed with
the hearings. In most instances the cases were decided after the
courts had defined the fundamental requirements of the law.
These decisions lead to the conclusion that the statute has been
employed to procure delays, to obtain hearings before a judge
whose views litigants believed to be less harsh than those of the
judge originally assigned to the case, and to make records for
appellate tribunals in order to obtain reversals because of the
failure of district judges to retire from proceedings. Judges are
naturally reluctant to institute contempt or disbarment actions,
and they prefer to protect fellow members of their profession.
The statute, however, has been construed strictly. This construc-
tion is the only practical relief afforded against the evil of affida-
vits which are not filed in good faith. It may be hoped that in
the future the same rule of strict construction will be followed
to the end that judges may exercise their legitimate functions in
the trial of cases.
59 See American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., supra
note 5, 1. c. 220,.221, and Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., supra note 24,
1. c. 588.
59 In re McFerren, supra note 17, 1. c. 182; Benedict v. Seiberling, supra
note 3, 1. c. 840-841; United States v. Fricke, supra note 43, 1. c. 545.
60 Bommarito v. United States, supra note 33, 1. c. 536; Bishop v. United
States, supra note 34, 1. c. 411.61 Berger v. United States, supra note 1.
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